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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This case comes to us following a jury verdict in favor 
of Penn Ridge Farms, LLC and against Fantasy Lane 
Thoroughbred Racing Stable, LLC. The jury awarded Penn 
Ridge $110,000 on its contract claim, $1 in nominal damages 
on its defamation claim, and $89,999 in punitive damages. The 
District Court reduced the punitive damages award to $5,500. 
Fantasy Lane asserted counterclaims for negligence, breach of 
contract, and breach of fiduciary duty, but was unsuccessful on 
each. Fantasy Lane appealed, seeking reversal of certain 
adverse rulings before and after the trial. Penn Ridge 
responded with a cross-appeal asking us to reinstate the full 




 Penn Ridge is a horse boarding and breeding facility 
near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Penn Ridge agreed to board 
several of Fantasy Lane’s horses starting in July 2012, 
including its thoroughbred stallion Uptowncharlybrown. The 
agreement obligated Penn Ridge to “act as Fantasy Lane’s 
agent for the promotion and management of 
Uptowncharlybrown’s stallion seasons, and . . . exercise its 
utmost good faith to promote, manage[,] and sell 
Uptowncharlybrown stallion seasons . . . .” App. 721. Penn 
Ridge also agreed to keep several of its own mares at the 
facility to support Uptowncharlybrown.  
 Beginning in August of 2013, Fantasy Lane got behind 
on its payments due to Penn Ridge. And after some of its horses 
became sick or injured and even died, Fantasy Lane refused to 
pay Penn Ridge boarding invoices totaling $65,707. The 
managing partner of Fantasy Lane, Robert Hutt, sent several 
emails to others in the horse-breeding industry expressing his 
dissatisfaction with Penn Ridge owner Michael Jester and the 
treatment of Fantasy Lane’s horses. 
In the midst of this dispute, Hutt told Dr. Jeffrey 
Edelson—the veterinarian designated by Penn Ridge—that 
Fantasy Lane was considering suing him for his role in treating 
their horses. The two negotiated and entered into a “General 
Settlement and Release Agreement.” Michael Jester & Penn 
Ridge Farms, LLC v. Robert Hutt & Fantasy Lane 
Thoroughbred Racing Stable, LLC, 2017 WL 1150648, at *2 
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2017). The agreement released “any and all 
persons, firms, or corporations liable or who might be 
liable . . . [from liability] arising out of or in any way relating 
to any injuries and damages of any and every kind . . . [in] the 
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care and/or treatment of any [Fantasy Lane] horses stabled at 
Penn Ridge . . . .” Id. (alterations in original). The settlement 
and release resolved the conflict between Dr. Edelson and 
Fantasy Lane, but did nothing to dispel the acrimony between 
Fantasy Lane and Penn Ridge. 
 
Penn Ridge sued Fantasy Lane in Pennsylvania state 
court for breach of contract and defamation. The contract claim 
was for nonpayment for boarding and breeding services 
provided to Fantasy Lane’s horses. The tort claim alleged that 
Hutt sent several defamatory emails about Penn Ridge and 
Jester’s competence, as well as the care given to horses stabled 
there, to several individuals in the industry who had an interest 
or prospective interest in Fantasy Lane. Hutt blamed Penn 
Ridge for the deaths of its horses, calling the staff 
“inexperienced,” and expressing that he had “no faith” in them. 
App. 768. He accused Penn Ridge of trying to conceal the 
problems, noting that Jester’s personality “was a cross of 
President Richard Nixon, and the character[] Jack Nicholson 
played in[] A Few Good Men” and that Jester was “the type of 
person that would say or do anything to save his ass.” App. 
786. Hutt also alleged that Jester told him “the truth” about one 
of the deaths—that Jester made the decision not to seek 
professional help or notify Fantasy Lane when Penn Ridge first 
discovered the horse was ill. App. 787–88. He also claimed 
Jester “was responsible for killing [the] horse and he 
deliberately[,] like Nixon[,] was the leader of the coverup 
[sic].” App. 788. 
Fantasy Lane removed the case to the District Court 
based on diversity of citizenship. In answering Penn Ridge’s 
amended complaint, Fantasy Lane brought counterclaims, 
including four negligence claims for the poor care and 
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mistreatment of its horses, a breach of contract claim for the 
promotion and management of Uptowncharlybrown, and a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim stemming from the stallion 
season issues. Penn Ridge moved for partial summary 
judgment, and the District Court granted the motion on the 
negligence counterclaims, holding that the agreement between 
Fantasy Lane and Dr. Edelson released all other parties who 
might be liable for injuries to Fantasy Lane’s horses while 
boarded at Penn Ridge. 
The remaining claims (breach of contract and 
defamation asserted by Penn Ridge and breach of contract and 
breach of fiduciary duty asserted by Fantasy Lane) were tried 
to a jury. After a three-day trial, the jury found for Penn Ridge, 
awarding it $110,000 for the breach of contract damages, $1 in 
nominal damages on its defamation claim, and $89,999 in 
punitive damages. The jury found against Fantasy Lane on its 
contract and fiduciary duty claims.  
Fantasy Lane filed a motion for a new trial or remittitur 
or, in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment under 
Rules 59(a) and 59(e). The motion was granted in part and 
denied in part. The District Court found the punitive damages 
award unconstitutionally excessive under BMW of North 
America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), and State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), 
and reduced it to $5,500. In the District Court’s opinion, this 
amount was “reasonable and proportionate to the harm 
suffered by [Penn Ridge] and conform[ed] to the requirements 
of the due process clause.” Jester v. Hutt, 2018 WL 4110625, 
at *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2018). But the Court declined to grant 
Fantasy Lane a new trial or reduce the contract damages award. 
Fantasy Lane appealed the Court’s partial summary judgment 
and partial denial of its post-trial motion. Penn Ridge cross-
6 
 
appealed the Court’s order reducing the punitive damages for 
defamation. 
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We exercise plenary review over a summary judgment, and we 
apply the same standard as the District Court. E.g., Watson v. 
Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2007). We review 
for abuse of discretion an order denying a motion for a new 
trial under Rule 59, City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. David 
Randall Assocs., Inc., 885 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2018), and a 
District Court’s ruling on a motion requesting remittitur, 
William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 646 F.3d 138, 142 (3d Cir. 
2011). We review de novo “a trial court’s constitutionally 
required reduction of damages.” Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 
617 F.3d 688, 716–17 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III 
A 
 We first consider Fantasy Lane’s contention that its 
negligence counterclaims were not amenable to summary 
judgment. The District Court relied on the general release Hutt 
signed (on behalf of Fantasy Lane) with Dr. Edelson, which 
released “any and all persons, firms, or corporations liable or 
who might be liable . . . [from liability] arising out of or in any 
way relating to any injuries and damages of any and every 
kind . . . [in] the care and/or treatment of any [Fantasy Lane] 
horses stabled at Penn Ridge . . . .” Jester, 2017 WL 1150648, 
at *2 (alterations in original). According to Fantasy Lane, Dr. 
Edelson obtained the release by falsely representing that his 
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attorney made only technical changes to the prior draft. And in 
reliance upon that representation, Hutt failed to read the 
revised settlement agreement and release. 
Under Pennsylvania law, “[i]t is well established that, 
in the absence of fraud, the failure to read a contract before 
signing it is ‘an unavailing excuse or defense and cannot justify 
an avoidance, modification[,] or nullification of the contract’; 
it is considered ‘supine negligence.’” Germantown Sav. Bank 
v. Talacki, 657 A.2d 1285, 1289 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (quoting 
Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 
563, 566 & n.* (Pa. 1983)). To show fraud, one must establish 
by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) a misrepresentation, 
(2) a fraudulent utterance thereof, (3) an intention by the maker 
that the recipient will thereby be induced to act, (4) justifiable 
reliance by the recipient upon the misrepresentation, and 
(5) damage to the recipient as a proximate result.” Mellon Bank 
Corp. v. First Union Real Estate Equity & Mortg. Invs., 951 
F.2d 1399, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Delahanty v. First Pa. 
Bank, N.A., 464 A.2d 1243, 1252 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)). 
Even if Dr. Edelson misrepresented the changes to 
induce Hutt’s acquiescence, Hutt’s reliance on those 
misrepresentations in lieu of reading the settlement agreement 
and release was not justifiable. As the District Court noted, 
Hutt had a chance to review the changes to the previous draft, 
which increased the length of the agreement from about one to 
three pages. This increase should have alerted Hutt that the 
revisions were meaningful. Nothing stopped Hutt from reading 
the short release, and the provision in question was not hidden 
or confusing. The language appeared on the second page in the 
key section discharging Dr. Edelson from liability, which was 
the very purpose of the release. 
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Fantasy Lane now insists Hutt’s averment in his sworn 
declaration that he lacks legal expertise creates a genuine issue 
of material fact which precluded the District Court from 
determining that it was unreasonable for Hutt—a “legally 
sophisticated former claims manager”—to rely on Dr. 
Edelson’s representation. Jester, 2017 WL 1150648, at *7. But 
Hutt’s stated lack of legal expertise provides no legal excuse 
for his failure to read the release. See Germantown Sav. Bank, 
657 A.2d at 1289. To absolve a party from reading a settlement 
agreement and release—especially a simple one spanning three 
pages—would do violence to the law of contract. See Standard 
Venetian Blind Co., 469 A.2d at 305–06 (explaining that 
allowing a party to “avoid application of the clear and 
unambiguous policy limitations” in an insurance contract 
because he did not read it would “require [the court] to rewrite 
the parties’ written contract”). Because Fantasy Lane has not 
shown Hutt justifiably relied on Dr. Edelson’s representations 
about the contract, it cannot claim fraud as an excuse for Hutt’s 
failure to scrutinize the agreement. See Mellon Bank Corp., 
951 F.2d at 1409. 
In sum, the clear language of the settlement agreement 
and release precludes Fantasy Lane from pursuing negligence 
claims related to the care of its horses. For that reason, the 
District Court did not err in granting partial summary judgment 
for Penn Ridge. 
B 
We next consider Fantasy Lane’s argument that the 
District Court should have granted its motion for a new trial on 
the parties’ respective contract claims.  
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To prevail, Fantasy Lane must show that “(1) the jury 
reached an unreasonable result, and (2) the District Court 
abused its broad discretion in not setting the verdict aside.” 
Leonard v. Stemtech Int’l Inc., 834 F.3d 376, 386 (3d Cir. 
2016). This is a high bar. A District Court should overturn a 
jury verdict only when “the ‘great weight’ of the evidence cuts 
against the verdict and ‘where a miscarriage of justice would 
result if the verdict were to stand.’” Springer v. Henry, 435 
F.3d 268, 274 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont 
de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1076 (3d Cir. 1996) (en 
banc)).  
Fantasy Lane contends the jury’s verdict for Penn Ridge 
on the contract dispute was “against the clear weight of the 
evidence.” Fantasy Lane Br. 27. The basis for this argument is 
Fantasy Lane’s insistence that Penn Ridge breached the 
agreement first. Fantasy Lane points to testimony from two 
people who were interested in breeding their mares to 
Uptowncharlybrown—one in the fall of 2012 and another in 
February 2013—but were either ignored or turned away by 
Penn Ridge. Because these incidents occurred before Fantasy 
Lane accrued a past-due balance for boarding services in 
August 2013, it claims the evidence shows Penn Ridge first 
breached the contract.  
We agree with the District Court that the testimony just 
mentioned is insufficient to overturn the jury’s verdict. The 
Court instructed the jury (as always) to evaluate the credibility 
of the witnesses testifying at trial. See William A. Graham Co., 
646 F.3d at 143. The mere fact that Fantasy Lane presented 
witness testimony supporting its counterclaim against Penn 
Ridge sheds no light on the credibility or weight the jury 
accorded such evidence. So it was no abuse of discretion to 




Fantasy Lane finally challenges as abuse of discretion 
that the District Court failed to reduce the jury’s $110,000 
compensatory award for contract damages.  
Under Pennsylvania law, “[j]udicial reduction of a jury 
award is appropriate only when the award is plainly excessive 
and exorbitant.” Zaukflik v. Pennsbury Sch. Dist., 104 A.3d 
1096, 1129 (Pa. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Haines 
v. Raven Arms, 640 A.2d 367, 369 (Pa. 1994)). To make this 
determination courts consider “whether the award of damages 
falls within the uncertain limits of fair and reasonable 
compensation or whether the verdict so shocks the sense of 
justice as to suggest the jury was influenced by partiality, 
prejudice, mistake, or corruption.” Id. (quoting Haines, 640 
A.2d at 369). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has instructed 
that “[i]n reviewing the award of damages, the appellate courts 
should give deference to the decisions of the trier of fact who 
is usually in a superior position to appraise and weigh the 
evidence.” Ferrer v. Trs. of Univ. of Pa., 825 A.2d 591, 611 
(Pa. 2002) (quoting Delahanty, 464 A.2d at 1257). 
Fantasy Lane emphasizes that “no demand had been 
made or evidence presented for a figure exceeding” the total 
invoice amount of $65,707 for six months of boarding fees. 
Fantasy Lane Br. 28. Fantasy Lane does not dispute that 
evidence at trial showed the horses stayed at Penn Ridge for 
another four months after the last invoice. Rather, it contends 
the damages the jury apparently awarded to remunerate Penn 
Ridge for that period cannot stand because Penn Ridge neither 
asked the jury to award damages for those months nor 
presented evidence for “any actual charges incurred by Fantasy 
Lane after the last invoice was sent.” Id.  
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Fantasy Lane claims the facts here are like those in 
Steinhauer v. Wilson, 485 A.2d 477 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). In 
that case, a Pennsylvania appellate court reduced the jury’s 
compensatory award by $1,000 because the jury awarded the 
plaintiff $21,000 despite expert testimony that the cost of 
repairs were between $18,000 and $20,000 “without allowance 
for overhead or profit.” Steinhauer, 485 A.2d at 479. Appellees 
argued it was reasonable to infer the jury included the extra 
$1,000 to cover additional costs. Id. The court disagreed, 
explaining that appellees presented no evidence to support the 
additional amount and that damages should be calculated with 
“reasonable certainty” rather than conjecture. Id. (quoting 
Gordon v. Trovato, 338 A.2d 653, 657 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975)). 
Fantasy Lane insists the same logic should apply here, arguing 
that because the $110,000 award was based on “conjecture that 
an additional amount was owed and upon [the jury’s] own 
conjecture of what that amount should be,” the District Court 
abused its discretion in not reducing the award. Fantasy Lane 
Br. 31.  
Fantasy Lane’s argument has some force because the 
jury’s decision to award more than the $65,707 stated on Penn 
Ridge’s invoices is unusual. But unusual is not the same thing 
as excessive, and Fantasy Lane has not proved what is required 
to upend the jury’s verdict. Here again, we agree with the 
District Court that “the verdict is not substantially larger than 
that which the evidence presented at trial could sustain.” Jester, 
2018 WL 4110625, at *4. The jury’s award of $110,000 was 
not, as Fantasy Lane contends, based on conjecture about the 
costs of the four additional months of boarding costs. The 
record supports the inference that the jury extrapolated the 
monthly boarding fees (about $11,000) from the invoices in 
evidence to cover the entire ten-month period at issue.  
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Nor are we persuaded by Fantasy Lane’s argument that 
this case is analogous to Steinhauer. The appellees there 
presented no evidence “tending to establish the [additional] 
amount of profit or overhead” awarded by the jury. Steinhauer, 
485 A.2d at 479. Here, the jury had six months of invoices to 
extrapolate from, and it reasonably calculated the monthly 
costs for the additional four months based on the $65,707 six-
month total. See App. 727–45. So we hold the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce Penn Ridge’s 
compensatory damages award. 
D 
 Finally, we turn to Penn Ridge’s challenge to the 
District Court’s reduction of the punitive damage award for 
defamation from $89,999 to $5,500. The District Court found 
the award unconstitutionally excessive after evaluating it under 
the two guideposts established by the Supreme Court in Gore 
and reaffirmed in State Farm: “(1) the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct” and “(2) the 
disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the 
plaintiff and the punitive damages award.”1 State Farm, 538 
U.S. at 418 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).  
 The focus of this appeal is the District Court’s 
application of the second guidepost. In considering State 
                                                 
1 The third guidepost—“the difference between the 
punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties 
authorized or imposed in comparable cases”—is not instructive 
here for defamation, a common law tort. See CGB 
Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs., Inc., 499 
F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2007). 
13 
 
Farm’s ratio guidance, the District Court recognized that “few 
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damage, to a significant degree, will satisfy due 
process.” Jester, 2018 WL 4110625, at *7 (quoting CGB 
Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs., Inc., 499 
F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir. 2007)). And the Court noted that here, 
“the jury awarded punitive damages in an amount 
approximately 90,000 times the compensatory damage award 
of $1.00.” Id. Because the Court determined in its 
reprehensibility analysis that Hutt’s conduct “was not so 
sufficiently egregious to warrant” a nearly $90,000 punitive 
award, it concluded that an award of “$5,500.00 [was] 
reasonable and proportionate to the harm suffered by Plaintiffs 
and conforms to the requirements of the due process clause.” 
Id. at *6, *7. So the Court reduced the punitive damage award 
accordingly.  
 We perceive two flaws in the District Court’s analysis. 
First, as Penn Ridge noted, the District Court mischaracterized 
the $1 award as compensatory. The verdict form shows that 
award was nominal: under the “compensatory damages” line 
item (after the question on whether Penn Ridge proved “Hutt 
published a defamatory statement of and concerning [Fantasy 
Lane]”), the verdict form stated, “[i]f you find that Plaintiffs 
are not entitled to any compensatory damages, you must award 
Plaintiffs $1 in nominal damages.” App. 872. Pennsylvania law 
does not, of course, treat nominal damages as synonymous 
with compensatory damages. See Carter v. May Dep’t Store 
Co., 853 A.2d 1037, 1041 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (explaining 
that under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 907, “[n]ominal 
damages are a trivial sum of money awarded to a litigant who 
has established a cause of action but has not established that he 
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is entitled to compensatory damages”). So the Court’s 
treatment of the $1 award as compensatory was incorrect.  
 The District Court also erred in comparing the $1 and 
$89,999 awards under the ratio guidepost. While the Court did 
not strictly follow the Supreme Court’s single-digit guidance 
(which would have required a reduction of the $89,999 to $9 
or less), see State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425, it cited this guidepost 
in its analysis reducing the punitive damages award.  
But both Gore and State Farm strongly suggest that 
following this guidepost does not apply to nominal awards. 
The Supreme Court explained that the ratio guidepost 
compares punitive damages to the “actual harm inflicted on the 
plaintiff,” Gore, 517 U.S. at 580, and that trial courts should 
consider the “ratio between punitive and compensatory 
damages,” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. In view of that 
guidance, several of our sister courts have held that the single-
digit ratio analysis does not apply to punitive awards 
accompanying nominal damages awards. See Arizona v. 
ASARCO LLC, 773 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2014); Saunders 
v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co. of Va., 526 F.3d 142, 154 (4th 
Cir. 2008); Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 121 n.11 (2d 
Cir. 2006); Romanski v. Detroit Entm’t, LLC., 428 F.3d 629, 
645 (6th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Kaufman Cty., 352 F.3d 994, 
1016 & n.76 (5th Cir. 2003); cf. Bryant v. Jeffrey Sand Co., 
919 F.3d 520, 528 (8th Cir. 2019) (“As in prior cases 
addressing nominal damages, we decline to place undue weight 
on the mathematical ratio between compensatory and punitive 
damages.”). As the Fourth Circuit explained, “when a jury only 
awards nominal damages or a small amount of compensatory 
damages, a punitive damages award may exceed the normal 
single digit ratio because a smaller amount ‘would utterly fail 
to serve the traditional purposes underlying an award of 
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punitive damages, which are to punish and deter.’” Saunders, 
526 F.3d at 154 (quoting Kemp v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 393 F.3d 
1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
 This approach to nominal awards is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of certain modest compensatory 
awards. See Romanski, 428 F.3d at 646. The Court explained 
in Gore that “low awards of compensatory damages may 
properly support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, 
if, for example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only 
a small amount of economic damages.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 582. 
And the Court noted that “[a] higher ratio may also be justified 
in cases in which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary 
value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to 
determine.” Id. This further suggests the ratio guidepost is 
inapt for nominal awards. See Romanski, 428 F.3d at 646. So 
we join our sister courts and hold that the single-digit ratio does 
not apply to nominal damage awards. 
 Without guidance from the ratio, how have courts 
evaluated the constitutionality of punitive damage awards? For 
starters, they have recognized that higher ratios between 
nominal and punitive awards “are to be expected.” Romanski, 
428 F.3d at 645; see also Saunders, 526 F.3d at 154; Fabri v. 
United Techs. Int’l, Inc., 387 F.3d 109, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Williams, 352 F.3d at 1016. And after acknowledging that the 
punitive award can exceed the single-digit ratio, courts often 
“compare it to punitive awards examined by courts ‘in [similar 
cases] to find limits and proportions.’” Romanski, 428 F.3d at 
645 (quoting Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 811 (2d Cir. 
1996)); see, e.g., Fabri, 387 F.3d at 126–27 (comparing the 
punitive damages award to others in similar cases); Williams, 
352 F.3d at 1016 n.78 (same); see also Saunders, 526 F.3d at 
154 (comparing the punitive damages award “to other cases 
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involving similar claims” and assessing whether a lower award 
would act as a meaningful deterrent). 
This approach accords with the Supreme Court’s 
characterization of the ratio guidepost as providing an 
“indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive damages 
award.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 580; see Romanski, 428 F.3d at 646 
(“This approach is necessarily unscientific but aids us in 
identifying a ballpark within which to evaluate the [punitive 
damages] award at issue here.”). In declining to adopt a 
“mathematical bright line between the constitutionally 
acceptable and . . . unacceptable” awards for the ratio 
guidepost, Gore, 517 U.S. at 583, the Court has explained that 
“a general concern of reasonableness properly enters into the 
constitutional calculus,” id. (alterations omitted) (quoting TXO 
Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 448 (1993)). 
Likewise, the Court described the reprehensibility analysis as 
“the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a 
punitive damages award.” Id. at 575. So the Court’s guideposts 
suggest that the touchstone for constitutional scrutiny of 
punitive damages awards is reasonableness. See Willow Inn, 
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Inc. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 
2005). Because we believe that comparisons to punitive awards 
in similar cases will help district courts assess the 
reasonableness of a punitive award when only nominal 
damages are given, we too endorse this approach.  
 Because the District Court mischaracterized the 
nominal award as compensatory and erroneously applied the 
ratio guidepost, we will vacate the Court’s order to the extent 
it reduces the punitive damages. In reevaluating the award on 
remand, the District Court should consider the reprehensibility 
of Hutt’s conduct and compare the $89,999 award to those in 
defamation or other dignitary tort cases that do not involve 
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physical harm. We also note that while courts act as 
gatekeepers to review the constitutionality of punitive 
damages, “we must accord ‘a measure of deference’ to the 
jury’s award.” CGB, 499 F.3d at 193 (quoting Willow Inn, 399 
F.3d at 231). When a court finds a jury’s punitive award 
unconstitutional, it should “decrease the award to an amount 
the evidence will bear, which amount must necessarily be as 
high—and may well be higher—than the level the court would 
have deemed appropriate if working on a clean slate.” Id. 
(quoting Willow Inn, 399 F.3d at 231). So if the District Court 
finds that the $89,999 punitive damages award is 
unconstitutionally excessive, it should explain why that 
amount is not within the range of reasonable punitive damages 
for this type of claim and why a lower award properly reflects 
the reprehensibility of Hutt’s conduct.  
* * * 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order granting partial summary judgment for Penn 
Ridge. We will also affirm the District Court’s post-trial order 
to the extent it denies Fantasy Lane’s motions for a new trial 
and reduction of the contract damages award, vacate that 
order’s reduction of Penn Ridge’s punitive damages award, 
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.  
